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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to study the local politics of compensatory education. It addresses the question of why some neighborhoods appeared to be more politically influential than others over the distribution of compensatory education funds in a large urban school district. Data for this study was gathered from 100 schools and neighborhoods of the Los Angeles Unified School District. A neighborhood was defined as a political unit corresponding to the attendance area of each school. Political influence was measured as the demonstrated ability of these neighborhoods to obtain and retain compensatory education funds from the district over a four-year period from 1969-1970 to 1972-1973. The study was planned within a framework for political systems analysis conceived by David Easton. The school district was conceived of as a political system. It was hypothesized that the system's outputs might be affected by differences in demand structures. Specifically, the political influence of each neighborhood was hypothesized to be at least partially a function of its demand structures. It was found that when ethnicity was specified the use of demand structures had a significant association with political influence especially among black neighborhoods. (Author/JM)

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NEIGHBORHOODS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE: A STUDY OF ESEA TITLE I

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NEIGHBORHOODS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE: A STUDY OF ESEA TITLE I

Much has been written about compensatory education and Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 in terms of national politics[1] or in terms of educational effects.[2] Few studies have considered the local politics of compensatory education. This paper attempts to study the local politics of compensatory education. It addresses the question of why some neighborhoods appeared to be more politically influential than others over the distribution of compensatory education funds in a large urban school district.

Data for this study was gathered from 100 schools and neighborhoods of the Los Angeles Unified School District. A neighborhood was defined as a political unit corresponding to the attendance area of each school. Political influence was measured as the demonstrated ability of these neighborhoods to obtain and retain compensatory education funds from the district over a four year period from 1969-1970 to 1972-1973.

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1 For example, see Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968); and Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey, An Act of Congress (New York: Norton, 1969).

2 For example, see Harry Picariello, "Evaluation of Title I," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, 1969), mimeo; and Michael Wargo, et. al., "ESEA Title I: A Reanalysis and Synthesis of Evaluation Data from Fiscal Year 1965 through 1970", (Palo Alto: American Institute for Research, March, 1972).

This paper is divided into four major sections. The first section provides a background for understanding the compensatory education program in Los Angeles. Second, the study's theoretical orientation is discussed. The third section describes the research design. Finally, the basic findings are reported and analyzed.

I. COMPENSATORY EDUCATION IN LOS ANGELES

In Los Angeles, Title I of ESEA constituted the major source of compensatory education funds. Title I was designed to help school districts "with concentrations of children from low income families" to provide for the "special educational needs of educationally deprived children". The Los Angeles Unified School District used a "multi-pocket" budgeting approach. Under this system, Title I schools[3] received the same amount of supplemental aid per pupil[4] with funds coming not only from Title I, but also from state and local sources.

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[3] "Title I Schools" refers to those schools which received supplemental aid for compensatory education programs, regardless of the funding source.

[4] There were some minor exceptions. For example, there was a differential between continuing and new Title I schools. In 1972-73 continuing Title I schools were allocated $285/pupil, whereas new Title I schools were allocated $270/pupil.

The responsibility for administration of Title I funds was divided among federal, state, and local education agencies.[5] The United States Office of Education (USOE) was responsible for the development and dissemination of general guidlines and the assessment of progress on a national basis. State agencies were allocated funds by a formula devised by USOE and were charged with the responsibility of assisting local agencies in developing projects, approving their applications, and submitting evaluations to USOE. The development, implementation, and operation of projects was the concern of local education agencies. The effect of this arrangement was that Title I acted as a block grant to local districts:

> Local districts (had) access to earmarked funds and latitude in designing projects, circumscribed only by the effectiveness of state supervision and federal criteria. Thus, even on paper, the local school districts had the greatest say in how Title I funds were to be spent.[6]

The Title I project in Los Angeles has had two distinct phases. During the first phase, from 1966 to 1969, a limited

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5 See Federick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1972) and United States Office of Education, History of Title I, ESEA (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965).

6 Jerome T. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Education Reform," Harvard Educational Review, 41:1 (February, 1971), 40.

amount of money was distributed to a large number of schools. Eligibility was determined with a variety of criteria including family income, percentage of foreign born, percentage of children from separated, divorced, or widowed families, dilapidated and deteriorating dwellings, population density, unemployment rates, average years of schooling completed by adults over twenty-five, and pupil reading comprehension scores. Not all schools identified as being eligible for funds by these criteria actually received funds. The selection process was unclear. There was not a clear decision rule used to determine which schools were to receive funds.

The second phase of Title I in Los Angeles, from 1969-1970 until at least the end of the 1972-73 school year, contrasted sharply with the first three years. Funds were concentrated on a fewer number of elementary schools with the total cost per pupil rising dramatically from an average of about $165/pupil during the first phase (1966-1969) to about $300/pupil for the second phase (1969-1973). Various socio-economic indicators were used to choose schools. For example, in 1972-73 the district reported that schools were chosen by a formula using assessed valuation of single family residences (weighted as 50% of the formula), Aid to Families with Dependent Children (weighted as 25% of the formula), and the percentage of children on the district's free lunch program (weighted as 25% of the formula). Within this setting, data was collected from schools to measure the political influence of neighborhoods during the second phase of the Title I project.

II. THE THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

The political influence of neighborhoods competing for Title I funds was studied within a framework for political systems analysis conceived by David Easton.[7] According to Easton, a political system consists of "those interactions which are authoritatively allocated for a society".[8] The school district was conceived of as a political system. It was hypothesized that the system's outputs might be affected by differences in demand structures. Specifically, the political influence of each neighborhood was hypothesized to be at least partially a function of its demand structures.

Defining Political Influence

Political influence was defined as the empirically demonstrated ability to obtain preferred outputs from the political system or the actual attainment of desired outputs. In this case, the output was Title I funding. Political influence referred to a

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[7] This study's theoretical orientation was drawn primarily from David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1965). Other related works by the same author include: A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965); and The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953).

[8] Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 21.

group's degree of success at influencing a political system to produce outputs which it viewed as being desirable, or to inhibit outputs which it viewed as being undesirable.

Political influence was measured by the degree to which schools corresponding to particular neighborhoods obtained or retained compensatory education funds through Title I of ESEA. This measure of political influence was chosen for significant analytical and empirical reasons. Consideration of Lasswell and Kaplan's definition of influence is instructive.[9] They defined influence as value position and value potential. Values may be welfare values or deference values. The former refer to necessities for maintenance of a person's physical activity such as health, safety, goods, services, skills, and certain kinds of knowledge. The latter refer to power, respect, rectitude, and affection. Values are distributed among members of a group such as a political system's citizenry. The nature of their distribution is the value pattern. A value position is the place a person or group occupies in the value pattern. A value potential "is the value position likely to be occupied as the outcome of conflict". Hence, according to Lasswell and Kaplan, influence is a function of the present position of a person or group in the value pattern and their

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9 Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 55-73.

probable position in the future.

For the purpose of this study, the definition of political influence was limited to the value position of neighborhoods only with respect to values authoritatively allocated by the political system. Value potentials were not considered. They were not considered, not because they are insignificant, but rather because they are difficult to measure. If one could have already accurately predicted the outcomes of future political conflicts, then this study was pointless.

However, measuring value positions is also not an easy task. Influence is a quality possessed to varying degrees. It manifests itself in two ways: (1) as a process--for example, the activities of neighborhoods to maintain their value position or to attain a higher value position; and (2) as an outcome of past political conflict or political processes. In a dynamic political system both of these manifestations must be present. By definition, as the political system changes through the consumption of resources, changing patterns of demands and supports, or other phenomena, each neighborhood must be involved in political processes.[10]

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[10] According to Easton, members of a political system's political community must play some role in the political division of labor even if that role is "one of complete passivity and acceptance of the absolute authority of others..." David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 178.

Therefore, a group's level of influence may be apparent through its activities, or through a summary of the successes and failures of its activities. Outcome of past conflicts may act as a summary.

These two manifestations of political influence are tightly interwoven with each other. Political processes will always precede the outcomes of those processes, and the outcomes will clearly be dependent on the nature of their related processes. Given the foregoing it might be argued that a neighborhood's level of political influence could be measured by collecting data on either the processes or outcomes.

Unfortunately, the empirical universe is often not as neat and simple as the analytical universe. At any given time neighborhoods are involved in many different activities and there are many different processes occurring within their political system. Suppose an issue emerges, there is political conflict, and then the issue is resolved. To an omniscient observer it would be unclear as to which of the multitude of activities and processes preceding the outcome of the political conflict caused the outcome. One cannot be certain that any one of several of the political phenomena occurring before the resolution of an issue was responsible for the outcome. Therefore, the research design of this study used the outcomes of past political processes to measure (indirectly) the political influence of neighborhoods.

Demand Structures

Differences of political influence among neighborhoods

was expected to be related to their differences in demand structures. This study assumed that every neighborhood desires Title I funds. That is, it was assumed that whether or not a want or expectation was ever expressed or ever entered the political system as a demand, all neighborhoods would rather have than not have compensatory education funds.

Easton defined a demand as "an expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so".[11] For desires or expectations of a neighborhood to enter the political system, they must be transformed into demands. Demands may flow to the political system through a variety of different kinds of channels. The pattern of a neighborhood's demand channels is its demand structure. For the purposes of this study, it was hypothesized that neighborhoods which had overt demand structures would have a higher level of political influence than those which did not.

Stated as a hypothesis:

> A neighborhood was more likely to have a high level of political influence if it used overt demand structures, than if it did not, ceteris paribus.

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[11] David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), 38.

The hypothesis refers to "overt demand structures" to distinguish between demand structures that could be identified through the data collection techniques employed and those demand structures which may have been used in a manner not subject to detection or measurement. Beyond this hypothesis, it is theoretically suggested that different kinds of demand structures will have different levels of effectiveness or will effect a neighborhood's political influence to varying degrees. These variations were explored, but are not reported as a part of this paper.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN

Major Controls

Four kinds of variables affect the nature of outputs for any political system. These general categories include variables of the decisional system, system resources, system demands and system supports.[12] Variables of the decisional system include the

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[12] Other writers have used slightly different lables. For example, Robert Salisbury identified the three major classes of variables that affect policy outputs as system resource variables, demand pattern variables, and decision system variables. See Robert H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles", in Political Science and Public Policy, ed., Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 151-175.

Jay Scribner identified five major classes of variables: (1) social and physical characteristics of the environment; (2) political system input characteristics; (3) internal characteristics of the authoritative decision-making agency; (4) political system output characteristics; and (5) environmental response characteristics. See Jay D. Scribner, "The Politics of Educational Reform: Analyses of Political Demand," Urban Education, 4:4 (January, 1970), 348-374.

system's constitutional order, the roles of formal and informal "politically relevant" members,[13] and the characteristics of authorities who fill particular roles; in short, the rules of the game. System resources refer to available and potential rewards the political system is able to distribute. They may vary depending on a system's natural resources, utility derived from granting symbolic rewards, or capacity to repress stressful demands. System supports include the internal resources of a neighborhood which are sought by the political system.

In order to examine and explore the effects of any one of these major categories of variables on outputs, it was necessary to control for large variations of variables in the other three categories. This study attempted to control variations in the decisional system and system resources by only examining a single political system: the Los Angeles Unified School District. If data from more than one school district were collected it would have been necessary to control for the effects of these two major kinds of variables in some other manner. Obviously, a school district's decision making structure (such as its rules, operating procedures, and

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[13] Easton defined "politically relevant members" of a political system as"...those who can and do participate in the political processes" and that "insofar as we consider them producers of demands and of specific support, we are viewing them with regard to activities that appear at the input boundary of a system", David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965) p. 401.

structures of authorities, as well as its system resources (such as its tax base and capital investments) affect its outputs or the outputs of its political sub-systems. The effects from variations in the support resources of each neighborhood were minimized by limiting the study to neighborhoods which generally had low levels of certain kinds of support resources. This was especially true with socio-economic variables and other support resources affected by socio-economic status. However, it was impossible to completely eleminate effects on political influence due to variations in support resources.[14]

Operational Definition of Political Influence

Controlling for the variations of several major classes of variables was not enough to test the hypothesis. Political influence, the major dependent variable, had to be defined precisely in relation to specific circumstances. Political influence was defined as the demonstrated ability of a neighborhood to obtain or retain Title I funds for their school from the 1969-70 school year to the

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[14] A question might also be raised about the impact on outputs possibly arising from variations in types of demands or variations in environment over time. However, as explained in subsequent sections, the types of demands are controlled by studying only one type: demands for Title I funds. Environmental changes over time are controlled by studying only the outputs of one political system. With environment changes of political subsystems over time it was presumed that they were unimportant unless they affected the demand structures of neighborhoods or categoric groups.

1972-73 school year. The phra e "demonstrated ability" requires elaboration. Was it possible for the school of a neighborhood without any "ability" at influencing the distribution of Title I funds to have obtained such funds? The answer, of course, was yes. Certainly there were some (if not many) schools which received Title I funds simply because they were the poorest, most needy, and most burdened with educationally disadvantaged children. These schools may have received funds although their neighborhood, by almost any measure, had a low level of political influence.

How could these neighborhoods and their schools be identified separately from high political influence schools that were just as needy? Simply stated, they could not be empirically distinguished. If a school received Title I funds, there were a number of alternative explanations. First, the school's neighborhood may have had a high level of political influence. That is, the neighborhood was able to transmit its demands to the appropriate decision making centers of the political system and to marshall a sufficiently high level support behind those demands. (However, a neighborhood with a low level of political influence might also have received funds because the objective formula for distinction of funds assumes, of course, that a formula to distribute funds can be completely objective). As indicated earlier, school districts had a relatively free hand in choosing the criteria they applied in distributing Title I funds among their schools. Some factors that might have been used

tended to be biased in favor of one or another categoric groups.[15] Therefore, if the formula was biased in favor of a certain school (thereby qualifying the school for funds) then the political categoric group to which that school's neighborhood belonged probably had a high level of political influence. The distribution formula and changes in it were a function of political processes -- the overt and subtle conflicts between competing groups. On this basis, it could be argued that although the school's neighborhood did not by itself have a high level of political influence it did through the organizations of the ethnic group corresponding to the ethnicity of its residents.

Another explanation for why a school received funds might be related to the influence of the school's principal. However, the actions of principals may be based on their anticipation of demands from parents who would want to know why their school did not receive extra funds. To prevent these latent stress producing demands, a principal might act by lobbying for Title I funds before

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15 For example, in Los Angeles, if greater weight was given to a neighborhood's percentage of residents receiving AFDC then the black neighborhoods were likely to receive more funds. However, if greater weight was given to another factor such as the percentage of children from non-English speaking homes or the percentage of foreign-born children, then the chicano neighborhoods were more benefited. All of these factors were widely held to be determinants of educational disadvantage.

the demands were expressed. A principal might also seek Title I funds to increase or maintain the diffuse support he received from the neighborhood served by his school.[16]

Other alternative explanations exist. It was beyond the scope of this study to consider all of them, There was not any clearcut way to empirically distinguish political influence from "apparent" political influence. For this reason, the operational definition of political influence was concerned with the demonstration of influence. The fact of demonstration was presumptive evidence that the ability existed. Thus, political influence was the demonstrated ability to secure and maintain Title I funds.

The period 1969-70 to 1972-73 was selected for study because 1969-70 represented the first year of saturated Title I funding in the Los Angeles Unified School District. Prior to 1969, Title I funds were scattered among a large number of schools. During those years each school's allotment of supplementary funds was so meager that many principals whose schools had received extra funds were unable to identify their source.[17]

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16 These are mere assumptions which may, or may not, have been true. A means to test them is described in a later section.

17 Preliminary interviews indicated that many school district employees firmly believed that Title I funding did not begin until 1969-70. It was difficult in interviews and impossible through questionnaires to obtain data from many principals and other administrators about the distribution and expenditure of Title I funds from 1966-69. Therefore, one of the major reasons for selecting only the 1969 to 1973 period for hypotheses testing was the problem of collecting data for earlier years.

Political influence was defined as a dichotomous variable. Neighborhoods were considered to have had a high level of political influence if their school received Title I funds all years since 1969. Other neighborhoods were labeled as having had a low level of political influence if their school received funds at least one, but not every, year since 1969. The neighborhoods of schools which did not receive any funds since 1969 were excluded. Stated otherwise:

A school's neighborhood was politically influential when:

$$P_n = 4$$

A school's neighborhood was not politically influential when:

$$1 \leq P_n \leq 4$$

where:

$$P_n = \sum_{i=1}^{4} x_i \ ;$$

--P_n represented political influence of the n^{th} neighborhood;

--i represented the ith year of saturated Title I funding (i = 1 represented 1969-70); and

--x_i represented whether a school did or did not receive Title I funds in the ith year (where $x_i = 1$ if it did and $x_i = 0$ if it did not).

Data Sources and Collection

Data used to calculate political influence for each neighborhood was obtained from the files, documents and publications of the Los Angeles Unified School District. Other data for variables

such as the racial composition of enrollments and pupil transiency, were also collected from these sources.

This data was supplemented by data from the 1970 census. Census data on variables, such as housing values and family income, was broken into neighborhood "tracts". That is, this data corresponded with the attendance area of each school that was studied.

Data or demand structures were collected from a questionnaire distributed to individuals who were principals of schools which received Title I funds any years from 1969-70 to 1972-73. The total universe of schools was 106 and the total number of principals who could have been sent questionnaires was 198. Because some principals could receive more than one questionnaire, if they had been principal of more than one Title I school, the total number of possible questionnaires was 215. Because some principals had retired, taken another job, passed away, or otherwise could not be located, only 193 questionnaires were effectively mailed (mailed without being returned for lack of a sufficient address). The total returned was 170 (N=170) Approximately 79% of all possible questionnaires were returned, or 88% of those effectively mailed.

These sources were supplemented with some loosely structured interviews with the principals of ten Title I schools. Four of these schools were selected for more intensive data collection. Data was collected on these schools through interviews with principals, teachers, advisory council chairmen, PTA presidents, community representatives to the advisory councils, and others who might have provided pertinent information or important perspectives.

In addition, a number of largely unstructured interviews were conducted with individuals who have been involved with the school district's Title I advisory committees, knowledgeable school employees, or others who participated in or were aware of the Title I program in Los Angeles.

Data Analysis

Tests of the hypothesis used chi square and Yule's Q. The hypothesis was subjected to a test using chi squares to determine the degree to which observed frequencies of high political influence neighborhoods corresponded to the theoretical frequencies suggested by their use of demand structures.

Yule's Q was used to determine the degree of correlation between political influence and the use of overt demand structures. A high degree of correlation tended to substantiate the hypothesis whereas a low, negligible, or negative correlation provided evidence to reject the hypothesis.

A number of test variables were introduced to control for factors which may have affected the apparent relationship between political influence beta and demand structures. These test variables included indicators of neighborhood socio-economic status, transiency family structure, and non-public school support.[18] When these

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[18] This paper only reports on the findings from the four test variables which had the most interesting effects. For example, the effects of housing values are not reported because of their similarity to those of income.

variables were dichotomized, every attempt was made to maximize the smallest expected cell frequency.

IV FINDINGS

The Hypothesis

The raw data for chi square distribution test of the hypothesis is shown in Table I. This table shows the numbers of neighborhoods with high and low levels of political influence associated with the use of demand structures. X^2 was calculated from this data. It indicated that the hypothesized relationship between demand structures and political influence was insignificant at the .05 level. Stated otherwise, the null hypothesis was confirmed. The value of X^2 was evidence to reject H_0 only at the .30 level.

Although the chi square test provided strong reasons to reject the hypothesis, Yule's Q was calculated to measure the strength and direction of correlation between the use of demand structures and political influence. The zero order correlation was +.21. This correlation was not significant ($p. > .025$) but it was in the hypothesized direction.

The fact that the correlation was in the hypothesized direction, despite its insignificance, raised the possibility of a variable or variables which might have acted to specify or to suppress the predicted relationship. There was reason to believe that ethnicity was such a variable.

TABLE I

Data for the Chi Square Distribution Test of the Hypothesis

	POLITICAL INFLUENCE		
	Low	High	Total
Demand structures	19	26	45
No demand structures	29	26	55
Total	48	52	N=100

Tests on the effects of ethnicity were revealing. First, the black enrollments of the elementary schools of each neighborhood were introduced as a third variable to measure its effects on the correlation between the use of any agents and political influence. The results are shown in Table 2. Notice that none of the variables were significantly correlated, but when the black enrollments were controlled the partial correlation between the use of demand structures and political influence increased. To be sure, the increase was minor and not significant.

The effect of ethnicity was further investigated by introducing chicano enrollments as a third variable. Table 3 shows the results of this. Still none of the relationships were significant, although the partial correlation between the use of demand structures and political influence was +.25 as compared with +.21 for the zero order correlation. Political influence was measured for the neighborhoods designated as "mixed" or "white", but the meager number of these neighborhoods (N=14) defied quantitative analyses.

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[19] Black and Chicano neighborhoods were defined as those neighborhoods which had schools with 81%, or more, of its enrollment classified respectively as Negro or Spanish surname students.

TABLE 2

Correlation Analysis of Black Enrollment
The Use of Demand Structures
And Political Influence
Of All Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Black enrollment	+.21	+.23
Black enrollment and political influence	Demand structures	+.07	+.02
Demand structures and black enrollment	Political influence	+.14	+.14

*$p \leq .025$

TABLE 3

Correlation Analysis of Chicano Enrollment,
The Use of Demand Structures
And Political Influence
Of All Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLES	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Chicano enrollment	+.21	+.25
Chicano enrollment and political influence	Demand structures	+.03	+.06
Demand structures and chicano enrollment	Political influence	-.13	-.14

*$p \leq .025$

The increases of the partial over the zero order correlation by controlling ethnicity were not impressive, but they did suggest that ethnicity may have acted to suppress the hypothesized relationship, or more probably, to specify the relationship. These tests raised an important question. Would the correlations between the use of demand structures with political influence substantially increase if the neighborhoods of each major ethnically defined categoric group was considered independently of other neighborhoods.

The effects of ethnicity were quite strong. X^2 for the relationship predicted by the hypothesis for only black neighborhoods was 4.85. This value was evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis at the .05 level.

Yule's Q was computed. For black neighborhoods the zero order correlation between the use of demand structures and political influence was +.55. This was statistically significant ($P \leq .025$). For chicano neighborhoods, the zero order correlation between the use of demand structures and political influence was +.02. This was not statistically significant.

In general, the evidence was mixed. The presence or absence of demand structures seemed to be related to political influence when ethnicity was controlled. This was especially true for black neighborhoods. However, the relationship was weak when ethnicity was not controlled or when only chicano neighborhoods were studied.

Test Variables

A number of test variables were identified. Results from using income, children in poverty level families, family structure, and private and parochial school support, as test variables are reported here.

Income. As one indicator of socio-economic status, a neighborhood's average family income[20] was an important test variable. According to official policy statements, Title I funds were distributed on the basis of need; schools with the greater need, or schools with neighborhoods of lower socio-economic status, received a higher priority of funds. Indeed, in most, but not all, cases, schools with the greatest need as calculated by an "objective" formula were designated as Title I schools, However, as it has been pointed out, the formula could not have been truly "objective". Nevertheless a significant negative correlation between socio-economic status indicators and political influence was expected.

Table 4 shows the effects of income and the use of demand structures on political influence of all neighborhoods. Income clearly had a very strong effect on political influence. More important, however, was the effect of the use of demand structures

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[20] The mean family income for each neighborhood was used. Median family income data were not available.

on political influence. Among high (relatively higher) income neighborhoods which did not use any demand structures, 26 per cent of the neighborhoods were measured with high levels of political influence whereas, 31 percent of the neighborhoods using demand structures were measured with high levels of political influence. The same effect was apparent among low income neighborhoods, with neighborhoods using demand structures 5 percent more likely to have high measures of political influence. Table 5 shows an analysis of these three variables. Only one of the correlations is significant, but it is interesting to note that although income appeared to explain part of the relationship between the use of demand structures and political influence, it distinctly did not fully explain the correlation.

These data suggested at least three generalizations. First, income was strongly and significantly related to political influence. Second, demand structures were weakly and not significantly related to political influence, and the relationship was not explained by income. Third, income and the use of demand structures had a cumulative impact on political influence. That is, neighborhoods least likely to have low levels of political influence were those which had high income levels and did not use demand structures. At the other extreme, neighborhoods most likely to have high levels of political influence were those which had low income levels and had used demand structures.

TABLE 4

The Effects of Income and the Use of Demand Structures on Political Influence of All Neighborhoods

Political influence	HIGH INCOME		LOW INCOME	
	No demand structures	Demand structures	No demand structures	Demand structures
High	26% (6)	31% (4)	63% (20)	68% (22)
Low	74% (17)	69% (9)	38% (12)	32% (10)
Total	100%	100%	101%	100%

TABLE 5

Correlation Analysis of Income, the Use of Demand Structures and Political Influence of All Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Income	+.21	+.13
Income and political influence	Demand structures	-.67*	-.66
Demand structrues	Political influence	-.28	-.23

*$p \leq .025$

The strength of the relationship dramatically increased when black and chicano neighborhoods were tested separately. Tables 6 and 7 show the effects of income and demand structures on political influence. Two patterns began to emerge from this data. There was a significant zero order correlation and an only slightly diminished partial correlation, between the use of demand structures and political influence with income as a test variable. Second, the use of demand structures had a more important effect on political influence among high income neighborhoods than among low income neighborhoods, at least when ethnicity was specified. This was deductively consistent with the study's theoretical base. The very needy, the poorest neighborhoods were likely to have schools which received Title I funds as long as their distribution was at least partially based on a formula that incorporated any reasonable "need" factor. Therefore, these neighborhoods had high levels of political influence. Ironically, the more fortunate or the higher socio-economic status neighborhoods may have been less fortunate with Title I allocations. Although disadvantaged when compared to the norm of all neighborhoods in Los Angeles, these neighborhoods were relatively less needy than the poorest ones. As a consequence, the fortunes of these neighborhoods may have depended more on political factors, such as their demand structures then did those of the more disadvantaged neighborhoods. At least, this was suggested by the data.

TABLE 6

The Effects of Income and the Use of Demand Structures on Political Influence of Black Neighborhoods

Political Influence	HIGH INCOME		LOW INCOME	
	No demand structures	Demand structures	No demand structures	Demand structures
High	9% (1)	25% (1)	59% (10)	72% (17)
Low	91% (10)	75% (3)	41% (7)	28% (5)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 7

Correlation Analysis of Income, the Use of Demand Structures and Political Influence of Black Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Income	+.55*	+.42
Income and political influence	Demand structures	-.87*	-.85
Demand structures	Political influences	-.56*	-.37

*$p \leq .025$

Table 3 shows similar data for chicano neighborhoods. Among high income neighborhoods, the use of demand structures increased the percentage of high political influence from 42 percent to 52 per cent. Conversely, the use of demand structures decreased the percentage of those with high political influence among low income neighborhoods from 71 per cent to 57 per cent. This 14 percentage point shift among low income neighborhoods explained the neligibie and obviously insignificant zero order correlation shown in Table 9. The specification effect of income on the relationship between demand structures and political influence was partially responsible for the lack of non-negligible correlations in this table.

Children in poverty-level families. An index of child poverty was used to test the effect of another socio-economic status variable. It was the ratio of children five to seventeen in families earning less than $3,000 to the enrollment of a neighborhood's elementary school. This variable was tested because it is an obvious indicator of a neighborhood's need and yet it was never directly used as a factor for Title I funding in Los Angeles.

Socio-economic status or need as measured by children in poverty-level families affected the use of demand structures and political influence in a manner nearly identical to that of income. This can be seen in Tables 10 and 11. There were, however, two important differences. First, controlling child poverty did not

TABLE 8

The Effects of Income and the Use of Demand Structures on Political Influence of Chicano Neighborhoods

Political Influence	HIGH INCOME		LOW INCOME	
	No Demand structures	Demand Structures	No demand structures	Demand structures
High	42% (5)	50% (3)	71% (5)	57% (4)
Low	58% (7)	50% (3)	29% (2)	43% (3)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 9

Correlation Analysis of Income and the Use of Demand Structures and Political Influence of Chicano Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Income	+.02	-.02
Income and political influence	Demand structures	-.39	-.43
Demand structures and income	Political influence	-.33	-.32

*$p \leq .025$

TABLE 10

The Effects of Children in Poverty-Level Families
and the Use of Demand Structures on
Political Influence of All Neighborhoods

Political Influence	LOW CHILD POVERTY INDEX		HIGH CHILD POVERTY INDEX	
	No demand structures	Demand Structures	No demand structures	Demand structures
High	41% (11)	50% (11)	54% (15)	65% (15)
Low	59% (16)	50% (11)	47% (13)	35% (8)
Total	100%	100%	101%	100%

TABLE 11

Correlation Analysis of Child Poverty, the Use of Demand Structures and Political Influence of All Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Child poverty	+.21	+.21
Child poverty and political influence	Demand structures	+.27	+.27
Demand structures and child poverty	Political influence	+.00	+.03

* $p \leq .025$

appear to explain the association between demand structures and political influence. Second, there was only a low positive association between child poverty and political influence and this was not statistically significant. This supported the notion that any need factor for Title I distribution formulas was likely to favor some neighborhoods over others even if their needs were relatively the same. The different effects of child poverty, in contrast to that of income suggested that, indeed, the officially stated formulas were used to distribute funds in most cases, but that the formulas were not (and probably could not be) truly objective. Furthermore, the data seemed to confirm some premises of this study's theoretical framework. The theoretical framework and the data suggested that the formulas were the result of political processes, and therefore, the political system's outputs, as measured by the actual distribution of funds, were also the result of political processes.

Family structure. Family structure was also tested for its potentially explanatory impact on the relationship between demand structures and political influence. Some of the data seemed to indicate that the proportion of families with female heads acted in a fashion similar to socio-economic variables. Demand structures and families with female heads appeared to have opposite and cumulative effects on political influence. These effects were quite small as shown by Table 12. So, if the proportion of

TABLE 12

Correlation Analysis of Families with Female Heads, the Use of Demand Structures and Political Influence of All Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Families with female heads	+.21	+.24
Families with female heads and political influence	Demand structures	+.09	+.17
Demand structures with female heads	Political influence	-.44*	-.45

*$p \leq .025$

families with female heads was a function of socio-economic status, as one might expect, then socio-economic status, as measured by this indicator, did not explain the relationship between demand structures and political influence and did not account for any non-negligible differences in political influence. The statistically significant and moderate positive association between the use of demand structures and families with female heads was of considerable interest. It indicated that neighborhoods with a large proportion of families with female heads with children present were not apt to have used distinct demand structures. This may have been because families with female heads with children cannot easily contribute to the political welfare of their neighborhoods. Their limitations in time, money, or other support resources are probably severe when compared to the limitations of husband-wife families.

The analysis of data on families with female heads, the use of demand structures and political influence for black neighborh ..s appear in Table 13. Families with female heads did not alter the relationship between demand structures and political influence. Although the correlation between families with female heads and political influence was small, the direction of association was not expected. If the proportion of families with female heads was inversely related to socio-economic status, and socio-economic status was negatively associated with political influence, then in the absence of intervening variables, families

TABLE 13

Correlation Analysis of Families with Female Heads, the Use of Demand Structures and Political Influence of Black Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Families with female heads	+.55*	+.58
Families with female heads and political influence	Demand structures	-.16	-.08
Demand structures and families with female heads	Political influence	-.29	-.25

*$p \leq .025$

with female heads would have had a positive correlation with political influence. However, the negative effect of families with female heads on a neighborhood's capacity to articulate demands may have intervened. Certainly, the negative correlation between the use of demand structures and families with female heads makes this a plausible line of reasoning.

Nevertheless, the proportion of families with female heads had effects similar to those of socio-economic status variables on the relationship between the use of demand structures and political influence. The use of demand structures was more important for black neighborhoods with low proportions of families with female heads (+.59) than among those with high proportions (+.33). Apparently, families with female heads had a dual effect on political influence. On one hand, it acted to decrease a neighborhood's political influence by decreasing its use of demand structures. On the other, it acted to increase a neighborhood's likelihood of obtaining Title I funds and its level of political influence because it was partially a function of socio-economic status.

These two conflicting effects are also shown in Table 14 for chicano neighborhoods. The table shows /the very strong negative correlation of families with female heads with the use of demand structures and the large increase of the partial over the zero order correlation of demand structures.

TABLE 14

Correlation Analysis of Families with Female Heads, the Use of Demand Structures and Political Influence of Chicano Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Families with female heads	+.02	+.46
Families with female heads and political influence	Demand structures	+.56	+.79
Demand structures and families with female heads	Political influence	-.86*	-.81

*$p \leq .025$

Non-public school support. An important variable to consider in any study of educational politics is the support extended by neighborhoods to private and parochial schools. Table 15 shows that non-public school support had a substantial negative correlation with political influence. One possible explanation is that the proportion of private and parochial school children may have been partially a function of socio-economic status. Neighborhoods with higher non-public school support, tended to have higher socio-economic status, and thus they were less likely to receive Title I funds.

The effects of non-public school support with black and chicano neighborhoods were highly dissimilar. Table 16 presents support for the existence of reinforcing causal system between non-public school support, the use of agents, and political influence for black neighborhoods. A slight increase in the difference between the differential and partial correlations of non-public school support and political influence would have provided substantial reason to adopt such a model.

Chicano neighborhoods provided a contrast with black neighborhoods as seen in Table 17. Non-public school support and political influence had an insignificant negative association of .25 for chicano neighborhoods compared to -.78 for black neighborhoods. The low negative association might have been due to the dominance of Catholicism in chicano neighborhoods. Families which

TABLE 15

Correlation Analysis of Non-Public School Support, the Use of Demand Structures and Political Influence of All Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Non-public school support	+.21	±.09
Non-public school support and political influence	Demand structures	-.69*	-.68
Demand structures and non-public school support	Political influence	-.29	-.25

*$p \leq .025$

TABLE 16

Correlation Analysis of Non-Public School Support, the Use of Demand Structures and Political Influence of Black Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Non-public school support	+.55*	+.32
Non-public school support and political influence	Demand structures	-.78*	-.74
Demand structures and non-public school support	Political influence	-.57*	-.4;

*$p \leq .025$

TABLE 17

Correlation Analysis of Non-Public School Support, the use of Demand Structures and Political Influence of Chicano Neighborhoods

VARIABLES	CONTROLLED VARIABLE	ZERO ORDER	PARTIAL
Demand structures and political influence	Non-public school support	+.02	-.07
Non-public school support and political influence	Demand structures	-.25	-.19
Demand structures and non-public school support	Political influence	+.25	+.21

*$p \leq .025$

could, and probably many which could not, afford to send their children to parochial schools did so. Hence non-public school enrollments and socio-economic status were not strongly related. However, one would at least expect some correlation between non-public school support and socio-economic status which would have given rise not to a negative, but a positive association between non-public school support and political influence. One explanation may be that non-public school support in chicano neighborhoods was an indicator of interest in education. Neighborhoods which had a higher level of concern for the quality of their children's education were likely to send a higher proportion of their children to non-public schools, and were also more likely to establish and use distinct demand channels to express their intereests to the political system. Certainly, the positive, albeit not statistically significant, correlation between the use of demand structures and non-public school support suggested that this explanation is worthy of consideration.

CONCLUSIONS

When ethnicity was specified the use of demand structures had a significant association with political influence especially among black neighborhoods. For chicano neighborhoods, there was a positive correlation only among those neighborhoods which had characteristics associated with high socio-economic status.

The data also suggested a number of other relationships. To summarize:

> Proposition 1. Socio-economic status was inversely related to the political influence (the likelihood of obtaining Title I funds) of neighborhoods from a single ethnic group.

As expected, the data seemed to support this proposition for variables used in distribution formulas such as income, but it was not strongly supported with other socio-economic status variables such as child poverty index.

> Proposition 2. The proportion of families of female heads of household with children present had a substantially different impact on the political influence of black neighborhoods than it did on chicano neighborhoods.

Among black neighborhoods there was a low negative association in contrast, there was a substantial positive association for chicano neighborhoods. This may be related to cultural differences; specifically, differences in the accepted role of women in politics.

> Proposition 3. The proportion of persons in non-public schools was inversely related to political influence.

For all neighborhoods the proportion of persons in non-public schools was found to have been negatively related to political influence with a stronger negative relationship for black neighborhoods.

The statistically significant and positive association between demand structures and political influence was not fully explained by any of the test variables, although variables related

to socio-economic status used in Title I distribution formulas did explain part of the relationship. Socio-economic status and demand structures tended to have a cumulative effect on political influence. Neighborhoods which had low socio-economic status charactertistics and used overt demand structures were more likely to have received Title I funds and have high levels of political influence than other neighborhoods.

The effects of socio-economic status were not unexpected because Title I funds were supposed to be distributed on the basis of need. For the most part, funds were distributed to the most disadvantaged neighborhoods. However, among the relatively less disadvantaged neighborhoods, political factors seemd to play an important role.

These findings pointed to an important question for future research. Do political factors in general, and neighborhood demand structures in particular, play an even larger role in determining the outputs of school districts and their distribution of benefits when the emphasis on need and the machinery to enforce that emphasis are not as pronounced as they were with Title I funds? Stated in other words, are the "reformed" bureaucracies of large urban schools, which were allegedly designed for efficiency and objectivity truly different and truly less "political", in the broad sense of the word, than the political machines which controlled the schools before the reform movements?